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PRESUMPTIONS IN VIOLENT DEATH CASES
OR QUO VADIS PRESUMPTION?
RICHARD M. WHITE*

The title to this paper is broader than its scope. The subject matter
will be limited to the use of presumptions in suits on life policies where
death was violent and the insurer's defense is suicide of the insured.
The insured under a double indemnity life insurance policy is found
in a locked room dead by a contact bullet wound. An airliner crashes under
mysterious circumstances killing a passenger who has recently taken out a
large amount of life insurance. An entertainer heavily insured under an
accidental death policy is found dead from an overdose of sleeping pills.
Investigation by the insurer in each of these cases and in literally thousands
of other violent death cases, may be inconclusive as to whether death was
by suicide, or there may be evidence of suicide ranging from "slight" to
''conclusive."
This paper does not attempt to fully cover the types of circumstantial
evidence that would be admissible on the issue of suicide. The cases have
given broad latitude in allowing the introduction of circumstantial evidence
and evidence which bears on the question of motive.1 Evidence of the pecuniary circumstances of the suicide victim is considered admissible.2 Recent
acquisition of large amounts of insurance otherwise unexplained would
have great evidentiary value. Other circumstances which have evidentiary
value are: a person's mental state; his physical health; his religious views;
his experience with the means whereby he has met death, for example, his
familiarity with firearms if death is the result of a gunshot wound; the loss
or affliction of a loved one; marital difficulties and other domestic relations;
* Miami, Florida; Member of the Florida and Virginia Bars.
1. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Boone, 236 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1956); Occidental
Life v. Graham, 22 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1927); Fleetwood v. Pacific Mut., 246 Ala. 571,
21 So.2d 696 (1945); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 70 Ga. App. 783, 29 S.E.2d 638
(1944); Heiman v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 183 La. 1045, 165 So. 195 (1935);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 437, 159 S.W.2d 81 (1942);
Federal Life v. Thomton, 21 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
2. See Annot., 17 AM. & ENG. ANN. CAS. 32, 39 (1910).
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statements of the deceased bearing upon his outlook on life; suicidal
threats and others.
In appraising such cases for settlement or in preparing for trial, an
important consideration, in addition to that of evidence, is the treatment

of presumptions in violent death cases by the courts of the particular
jurisdiction.
Webster defines "presumption" as follows:
Ground for presuming, or believing probable; probable, but not
conclusive . . . An inference as to the existence of one fact not
certainly known, from the known existence of some other fact.a
Black distinguishes between a presumption of fact and one of law:
Of fact-An inference affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth
or falsehood of any proposition or fact drawn by a process of
probable reasoning in the absence of actual certainty of its truth
or falsehood, or until such certainty can be ascertained.
Of law - A rule of law that courts and judges shall draw a
particular inference from a particular fact, or from particular4
evidence, unless and until the truth of such inference is disproved.
The courts of the United States have long recognized the "presumption
against suicide" or the so-called "presumption in favor of accidental death,"
but there has been such a diverse application of this presumption that it
has frequently been reviewed by the writers and courts with substantial
criticism.
Most life insurance policies provide that if death occurs from suicide
during the contestable period or during the period within which the
defense of suicide may be used the only liability of the insurer is to refund
the premiums paid. In the event an insurer's defense to a suit for the
face amount of a life policy is based on suicide, such a defense must be
affirmatively pleaded and the burden of proof of this issue - suicide - is
on the defendant insurer.5 Accident policies and double indemnity provisions of life insurance contracts usually provide for benefits or additional
benefits in. the event that death is due solely to violent and external
accidental means. The great majority of cases hold that in a suit to collect
accidental death benefits or double indemnity benefits, the burden of proof
is on the beneficiary, aided by the presumption against suicide, to prove
that the cause of death was accidental.6 Policy litigation involving these
3. WEBSE'rjR, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1958 (2d
4. BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 1349 (4th ed. 1951).

ed. 1951).

5. Canada Life Assur. Co. v. Houston, 241 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Boone, 236 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1956); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash,
97 So.2d 4 (.Fla. 1957); Kettlewell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 4 Ill.2d 383,
122 N.E.2d 817 (1954).
6. Scales v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 109 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1940);
O'Brien v. Jolm Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 A.2d 329 (Conn. 1955); Anderson
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 140 Fla. 198, 191 So. 307 (1939); American Nat'l Ins. Co.
v. Craft, 22 Miss. 847, 77 So.2d 679 (1955); Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
257 App. Div. 656, 15 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1939).
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two types of cases is unfortunately very common. It would seem that by
now the courts would have a fairly well established rule for the application
of the presumption against suicide, but not so.
Generally speaking, the decisions can be divided into two general classifications of treatment-one stating that the presumption against suicide
or in favor of accidental death is a rule of evidence 7 and the other stating
that it is a rule of law.8 As a rule of evidence, the court in instructing the
jury, charges, regardless of evidence to the contrary, that there is a presumption
against suicide and that such presumption is to be weighed as evidence in
arriving at a verdict. Treated as a rule of law, the presumption is for the use of
the court in determining upon whom the burden of going forward with the
evidence rests. Under this latter application, the presumption against suicide
is given effect only in suits on accidental death policies or on double indemnity claims. The courts holding that the presumption against suicide
should be used as a rule of law assert that this presumption does not affect
the ultimate burden of persuasion." Once the plaintiff has established that
death was violent, the presumption merely shifts the burden of going forward
with the evidence to the defendant insurer, and as soon as any evidence is
introduced inferring that death was by suicide the presumption disappears
and the issue, by the better view, is then determined by a preponderance
of the evidence. The plaintiff's initial proof of violent and external death
may be such that it causes the presumption against suicide to vanish. 10
In the jurisdictions holding that the presumption is a rule of evidence,
the presumption is applied in accidental death cases, double indemnity
cases and in suits for the face amount of the policy where suicide is a defense within the contestable period of the policy. Where the suit involves
a claim on a double indemnity policy within the contestable period and the
defense to both the claim for the basic amount of the policy as well as to
the claim for double indemnity benefits is that the insured committed
suicide, sometimes a rather unusual and anomalous result can occur if
7. Gordon v. State, 110 So.2d 329 (Ala. App. 1958), rev'd on other grounds,
110 So.2d 334 (Ala. 1959); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beeson, 229 Ala. 140, 155

So. 530 (1934); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 152 Ark. 597, 240 S.W. 25 (1922);

Connell v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 139 Iowa 444, 116 N.W. 820 (1908);

Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P.2d 579 (1942); Provident
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935).
8. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161 (1938); Jefferson Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935); New York Life Ins. Co. v.

Satcher, 152 Fla. 411, 12 So.2d 108 (1943); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tuggle, 254
Ky. 814, 72 S.W.2d 440 (1934); Wellich v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293
N.Y. 178, 56 N.E.2d 540 (1944); Domanowsky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 N.J.L. 247,
182 Atl. 906 (1936); Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 266,

87 N.E.2d 156 (1949); Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644
(1934); Headlee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 S.D. 499, 12 N.W.2d 313 (1943).
9. In this regard the court in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 30 F.2d 80, 82
(6th Cir.
evidentiary
as the risk
throughout

1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 852 (1929) said, "A presumption is not
in its nature, and the burden of proof, in its usual and primary meaning
of nonpersuasion of the jury, never shifts, hut remains with the affirmative
the case."

10. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935).
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both the plaintiff and the defendant fail to meet their respective burdens of
persuasion. The burden of persuasion on the basic amount of the policy
would be on the defendant, who has pleaded the affirmative defense of
suicide. The burden of persuasion of establishing death in a manner entitling the beneficiary to the double indemnity benefits would be on the plaintiff. It should be noted that the term "burden of proof" encompasses both
the concepts of the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden
of persuasion. The latter is always upon the proponent of an issue and never
shifts; the former may shift from the proponent to the opponent or vice
versa.11 It is conceivable that the jury could conclude that the insurer had
failed to prove suicide and was therefore liable for the face amount of the
policy, and at the same time find that the beneficiary had failed to prove
accidental death and was not therefore entitled to the double indemnity
benefits. In such a situation neither party would have sustained his burden
of persuasion as proponent of the particular issue.
The lay person's familiarity with presumptions is limited to criminal
cases where the accused is presumed innocent and to the extraordinary
degree of proof required to overcome such a presumption, that is, proof of
guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. In the attempt to explain the weight to
be accorded the presumption against suicide, the courts, in charging the jury,
have not only failed to properly instruct the jury, but in many instances
have probably reaffirmed the jurors' belief that this presumption against
suicide must be overcome by proof beyond any reasonable doubt. This
is simply not the degree of persuasion required in the vast majority of
jurisdictions. 1 2 However, the Supreme Court of Florida apparently became
as confused as most juries in one instance and required the criminal degree
of persuasion to prove suicide as a defense in a civil suit on the face value
of a life policy.'
As a rule of evidence, the presumption against suicide is used in two
ways. Some courts say that this presumption is to be weighed along with
11. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485-2489 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 115 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1940); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Truly, 16 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1926); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yeldell, 36 Ala. App. 652, 62 So.2d 805 (1953); Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cobbs,
23 Ala. App. 205, 123 So. 94 (1929); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 60 Ariz.
416, 138 P.2d 414 (1943); Hamilton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 784,
32 S.E.2d 540 (1945); Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 11. 35, 22 Am. Rep.
180 (1875); Heiiman v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 185 La. 1045, 165 So. 195 (1935);
Kohlman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 151 La. 607, 92 So. 132 (1922); Cox v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 Me. 167, 28 A.2d 143 (1942); Stuckum v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 283 Mich. 297, 277 N.W. 891 (1938); Edwards v. Business Men's Assur.
Co. of America, 350 Mo. 66, 168 S.W.2d 82 (1943); Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 132 Neb. 831, 273 N.W. 478 (1937); Tauriello v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 605 (App. Div. 1940); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rosier,
189 Okla. 448, 117 P.2d 793 (1941); Rasner v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
140 Pa. Super. 124, 13 A.2d 118 (1940); Dill v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of
the World, 126 S.C. 303, 120 S.E. 61 (1923); Mutual Benefit Health & Acc.
Ass'n v. Denton, 22 Tenn. App. 495, 124 S.W.2d 278 (1939).
13. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Satcher, 152 Fla. 411, 12 So.2d 108 (1943).
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other evidence; 14 and some courts hold that this presumption is the tiebreaking vote, that is, if the evidence is hopelessly in conflict as to the
cause of death, and the jurors are unable to decide which evidence outweighs the other, then the scale should be tipped by the presumption against
suicide.' 5 One obvious objection to the use of the presumption as evidence
is that such a charge is often given when the only reasonable hypothesis
is that of suicide and the charging of a presumption allows the jury to
deliberate an issue which should receive a directed verdict. The cases are
voluminous where juries have returned a verdict for the insured in the face
of overwhelming evidence of suicide.10 The presumption no doubt gave them
an excuse for such a verdict if it did not directly influence their decision.
Another difficulty in the use of the presumption against suicide as a
rule of evidence is encountered in attempting to define and explain this
presumption to the jury. In giving probative value to the presumption
against suicide, how much weight is given to such a presumption? How

much evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption? What is a presumption? How does this presumption differ from other presumptions?
These questions must be answered by the court in its charge to the jury
if a presumption is to be charged. There are literally hundreds of written
decisions resulting from appeals in cases where the jury has received varied
instructions as to the probative value to be given the presumption against
suicide. Since the interpretation of this presumption as a rule of evidence
is virtually impossible by even the above-average jury, the use of the presumption as a rule of evidence has been examined and criticized by many
writers and by the appellate courts of many states.' 7 There has been a great
amount of confusion in the treatment and interpretation of this presumption
against suicide where the courts have applied it as a rule of evidence.
There is no uniformity in the decisions as to the quantum of proof
required to overcome this presumption against suicide. Some cases hold
14. See note 7 supra.
15. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias of the World v. Beck, 181 U.S. 49
(1901); Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 206 Ark. 229, 174 S.W.2d 559
(1943); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Graves, 201 Ark. 189, 143 S.W.2d 1102 (1940);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Johnson, 122 Fla. 567, 166 So. 442 (1935); Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Wiswell, 56 Kan. 765, 44 Pac. 996 (1896); Mutual Benefit
Health & Ace. Ass'n v. Denton, 22 Tenn. App. 495, 124 S.W.2d 278 (1939).
16. In Brotherhood v. Page, 197 Ark. 498, 501, 123 S.W.2d 536, 537 (1939)
the court stated: "It must be conceded that we have a number of cases of very
tenuous character, affirming verdicts apparently finding that the insured had not
committed suicide, in which the evidence greatly preponderated to the contrary.";
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 182 Ark. 901, 33 S.W.2d 1102 (1930); Cox v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 172 Cal. App.2d 629, 343 P.2d 99 (1959); See also

P.

HENRY, THE TRIAL OF SUICIDE CASES, PROCEEDINGS OF LEGAL SECTION OF AMERICAN
LIFE CONVENTION 57-96 (1956).

17. See, e.g., Wallin, The Presumption Against Suicide in Insurance Cases in the
District of Columbia, 46 CEO. L.J. 503 (1958); Fallon, Coverage and Suicide in Life
Insurance, 58 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1953); Breyfogle & Richardson, 'Problems of Proof in
Distinguishing Suicide from Accident, 56 YALE L.J. 482 (1947); Hartman, The
Presumption Against Suicide as Applied in the Trial of Insurance Cases, 19 MARQ.
L. REV. 20 (1934).
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that the mere preponderance of evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption.' 8 Other cases say that the presumption against suicide may be
overcome by circumstantial evidence only where the circumstances leave room
for no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide.'" This rule would
seem to require that the proof eliminate all doubt in order to overcome the
presumption, yet the majority of states have refused to apply that degree of
proof. According to some cases, these two rules as to the amount of proof
20
required to overcome the presumption against suicide are not inconsistent.
Yet, other cases hold that a mere preponderance of the evidence is insuffi2t
cient to overcome the presumption.
At least one case which has not been specifically reversed states that
the presumption against suicide can be overcome only by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 22 This rule may have been abandoned by the Florida
Supreme Court in City of Jacksonville v. Waldrep.23 If not, then Florida
evidently requires one degree of persuasion to overcome the presumption
against suicide in accidental death policies, 24 and another degree of proof
18. See note 12 supra.
19. Parrish v. United Commercial Travelers of America, 232 Fed. 425 (4th Cir.
1916); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 60 Ariz. 416, 138 P.2d 414 (1943);
Wilkinson v. National Life Ass'n of Des Moines, 203 Iowa 960, 211 N.W. 238 (1926);
Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 182 N.V. 808 (1921); Brignac v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Calif., 112 La. 574, 36 So. 595 (1904); Lindall v.
Supreme Court I.O.F., 100 Minn. 87, 110 N.W. 358 (1907); Hendrix v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 250 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1952); Tully v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
234 Wis. 549, 291 N.W. 804 (1940).
20. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Dolan, 46 Ind. App. 40, 91 N.E. 970 (1910).
21. Taber v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 13 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1926); Goodbar
v.Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 89 W. Va. 221, 108 S.E. 896 (1921).
22. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Satcher, 152 Fla. 411, 412, 12 So.2d 108
(1943) the court said, "The rule is generally approved that when the defendant comes
forward with a plea of suicide he must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt just as he
would the defense in a criminal case. The evidence must exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis of death."
It might be noted that Virginia has adopted the so-called extreme doctrine
requiring that suicide be established only when there is clear and convincing evidence
excluding every reasonable theory of accident; this apparently applied whether suicide
be established as a matter of law or upon a finding by the jury. In commenting upon
this view in Note, 34 VA. L. Rrv. 378 (1948) the author stated, "It is difficult
to see when a jury will be allowed to pass on the question. If the evidence of suicide
is clear and convincing, the defendant is entitled to a peremptory ruling; if the
evidence is less persuasive than that, any finding by the jury that death resulted from
suicide would be set aside as being contrary to the evidence."
23. 63 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1953). In this case, the court, in receding from its
pronouncement in the case of Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Acheson, 102 Fla. 15,
140 So. 467 (1932) stated that it had inadvertently adopted the rule with reference
to circumstantial evidence which obtains in criminal cases. It quoted with approval its
pronouncement in King v. Weis-Patterson Lumber Co., 124 Fla. 272, 273, 168 So. 858,
859 (1936) wherein it stated:
Where circumstantial evidence is relied on in a civil case to prove an
essential fact or circumstance essential to recovery, the rule is that the particular
inference of the existence of the fact relied on as arising from the circumstances established by the evidence adduced, shall outweigh all contrary
inferences to such extent as to amount to a preponderance of all of the
reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the same circumstances.
24. Anderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 140 Fla. 198, 191 So. 307 (1939).
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to overcome the presumption where suicide is pleaded as an affirmative
25
defense where death occurred during the contestable period of a life policy.
Another court has stated that a simple denial by the insurer that the
insured met his death by accidental means is the equivalent to an affirmative
plea of suicide. 26 Ordinarily, in an action for the face amount of the policy,
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish accidental death, the
presumption against suicide merely shifting the burden of going forward
with the evidence to the defendant insurer. Once any evidence is offered
to show the cause of death then the presumption disappears. 21 Since the
burden of persuasion as to the particular issue is on one who asserts it,
the Bell case2 8 goes farther than most cases and places on the defendant
insurer the burden of persuasion. Another extreme view has evidently been
adopted by the courts of Virginia which in effect says that when the insurer
relies on circumstantial evidence to establish suicide, the insurer will not
29
be entitled to a jury verdict unless he is entitled to a directed verdict.
The Virginia courts have adopted the view that the presumption against
suicide may only be overcome by circumstantial evidence where such
evidence is clear and convincing and excludes every reasonable theory of
30
accident.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted an unusual and incomprehensible rule wherein it requires circumstantial evidence to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of accidental death in order to prove suicide, yet,
. . . where proof of motive is essential to overcome the legal
presumption against suicide, the burden is upon the pleader to
establish motive by a fair preponderance of the evidence."Oa
The trial of insurance cases in which the defense is suicide has
resulted in such a preponderance of verdicts against the insurer, that one
writer has stated that the only way to win a suicide case is by getting
a directed verdict, 31 which as pointed out above may be the only way
in Virginia in the absence of direct evidence.3 2 Due to the natural sympathy
25. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Satcher, 152 Fla. 411, 12 So.2d 108 (1943).
26. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bell, 188 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1951).
27. Some courts require something more than "any" evidence to cause the burden
of going forward to shift from the party in whose favor the presumption operates.
See, e.g., Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Sims, 208 Ark. 1069, 189 S.W.2d 193 (1945)
("substantial" evidence); Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 298 Ky. 471,
183 S.W.2d 499 (1944) ("sufficient" evidence); Kath v. Kath, 238 Minn. 120,
55 N.W.2d 691 ("competent" evidence); State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S.W.2d
596 (1951) ("substantial" evidence); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Creenwade, 138
Tex. 450, 159 S.W.2d 854 (1942) ("clear, positive and disinterested" evidence).
28. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bell, 188 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1951).
29. Harless v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 186 Va. 826, 44 S.E.2d 430 (1947); Life
Ins. Co. of Va. v. Brockman, 173 Va. 86, 3 S.E.2d 480 (1939).
30. See Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 378 (1948).
30a. Heiman v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 183 La. 1045, 1049, 165 So. 195, 196
(1935).
31. P. HENRY, THE TRIAL OF SUICIDE CASES, PROCEEDINGS OF LEGAL SECTION OF
AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 57-96 (1956).
32. See quote from Note, 34 VA. L. REV. 378 (1948) supra note 22.
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of a jury for a bereaved family, we cannot explain all of the verdicts
adverse to the insurer in suicide cases by the use or mis-use of presumptions
against suicide; however, the writer submits that the presumption against
suicide when used as a rule of evidence places the insurer at an unfair
disadvantage.
There has yet to be found a logical or comprehensible standard of
the weight that a jury should give to the presumption against suicide
when treated as evidence. How then can a jury determine just how much
evidence is required to overcome such a presumption? The answer is that
the jury has no way of knowing and not knowing how much weight to
accord the presuhmption against suicide, the jury will of necessity place its
own interpretation on this presumption since a meaningful charge is
impossible.
Certainly it would be permissible to remind the jury that the majority
of violent death cases are accidental rather than suicidal, but the writer
takes issue 3with
the decisions that say that suicide is "improbable"'3 or
"unnatural" 4 and that the jury may be so instructed. One only has to read
the newspapers or to check the statistics in the Almanac to know that
suicide is far too prevalent. There were 18,490 cases of reported suicides
in 1958 in the United States -almost
one-half of the number of those
killed in motor vehicle accidents.33 There are many other attempted suicides
and successful suicides which because of the stigma attached to suicide
are never recorded. Suicide is not so uncommon an occurrence as to warrant
special and peculiar obstacles for a jury to hurdle in arriving at a finding
of suicide. A burden of persuasion charge to the jury is all that is necessary
in order for a jury to make a finding of fact on the issue of accidental
death, or of suicide where suicide is an affirmative defense. A fair instruction
would be one ignoring the presumption entirely and pointing out that if the
evidence of suicide and that of accidental death bring the scale of justice
into even balance, then the verdict should be against the one having the
burden of persuasion.
Not only is the application of the presumption against suicide not
uniform, but the reasons given for the use of this presumption are varied.
One case holds that the basis for the presumption against suicide where
the circumstances are such that death may have been caused by either
accident or suicide is the statutory presumption that "a person is innocent
'
of a crime or wrong."36
One writer states that the presumption against
suicide is a "judicial recognition of what is probable. 37 Many cases have
held that this presumption is based on the natural love of life by an
33. Grand Lodge v. Banister, 80 Ark. 190, 96 S.W. 742 (1906); Watkins v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Aft. 644 (1934).
34. Modern Woodmen v. Craiger, 175 Ind. 30, 92 N.E. 113 (1910).
35.

WORLD ALMANAC

307 (Hansen ed. 1960).

36. Wilkinson v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 252, 180 Pac. 607 (1919).
37.

TIHAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE

334 (1898).

1960]

PRESUMPTIONS IN

VIOLENT DEATH

individual.38 One purpose of many presumptions of law is to afford some
desired protection for certain types of litigants, for example, the presumption
of legitimacy and the presumption of innocence of a crime. Experience has
taught us only too well that the beneficiary under a life policy needs no
special protection by the court. It is the insurer who needs, but does not
usually receive, protection from the sympathy of a juror for a bereaved
widow or child. An impartial verdict is rare when the evidence points to
suicide.39 It is incumbent upon the courts, and in some states upon the
legislature, to reexamine the purpose served by what is possibly an
anachronism and to consider whether perhaps the presumption against
suicide is without present-day foundation and is therefore unnecessary and
undesirable. If we are to support the proposition that the presumption is
without present-day foundation, it becomes necessary to investigate the
historical origin of the presumption 40 to determine from the scholar's viewpoint, the evolution of its obsolescence.
While the idea of suicide is revolting even to the modern senses, under
the early law of England suicide was considered so offensive that the law
demanded severe punishment and humiliation for the family of the suicide
victim. Blackstone 4' relates that the law of England required the forfeiture
of all of the deceased's goods and chattels to the Crown and required
an ignominious burial on the public highway with a stake driven through
the body. 42 One writer attributes the origin of the presumption against
suicide to lawyers who developed this shield for the protection of the
widow and children against the forfeiture of the decedent's goods and the
humiliation and stigma attached to suicide.43 Humiliation remains, but
38. New York Life Ins. Co. v. King, 28 Ga. App. 607, 112 S.E. 383 (1922);
Modem Woodmen v. Craiger, 175 Ind. 30, 92 N.E. 113 (1910); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Milward, 118 Ky. 716, 82 S.W. 364 (1904); Parker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 289 Mo. 42,
232 S.W. 708 (1921); Brunswick v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213
S.W. 45 (1919).

39. In the article by P.

HENRY, THE TRIAL OF SUICIDE CASES, PROCEEDINGS OF

LEGAL SECTION OF AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 57-96 (1956), the author pointed out

that out of 173 cases surveyed, 153 were decided by the juries in favor of the plaintiffinsured. Mr. Henry went on to say, "It is therefore plain that the only place where
the insurance company can hope to receive an unprejudiced examination of its defense
is in the appellate court."
40. Blackstone states that the civil law did not regard suicide as placing any
humiliation upon the family of the deceased or any blot upon his reputation. "Si quis
impatientia doloris, aut roedio vitae, aut morbo, aut furore, aut pudure, more maluit,
non animadvertaturin eum." (If any one sinking under the pressure of grief, or weariness
of life, disease, madness or shame, shall prefer death, his conduct shall not be considered
to the prejudice of his character.) 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 (Cooley's 4th ed.
1899). This adds emphasis to the writer's contention that the basis upon which the
presumption against suicide was originally founded, i.e., humiliation, lacks universal
acceptance.
41. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 (Cooley's 4th ed. 1899).
42. These measures were taken hoping that the care of the felo de se for either
his own reputation, or the welfare of his family, would be some motive to restrain him
from so desperate and wicked an act.

43. Hartman, The Presumption Against Suicide as Applied in the Trial of Suicide
Cases, 19 MARQ. L. REV. 20 (1934).
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the family of the decedent no longer suffers forfeiture of property, 44 but on
the contrary, the family often benefits financially from suicide. The
humiliation suffered by the surviving family is no basis for such a legal
presumption which would affect the contractual rights of the insurer.
The courts of this country inherited the presumption against suicide
with the common law, but one of the most admirable traits of the common
law is its flexibility, and if the reason for the rule of law no longer exists,
then the rule should be abolished. As a rule of law the presumption
should be used only in the exceptional and unusual case where there is
no evidence of any kind offered as to the cause of violent death. As a
practical matter, the modern insurance company, from a financial and public
relations standpoint, cannot afford to defend an accidental death claim
where there is no reasonable evidence of suicide. Under the federal
practice 45 and in those states4" whose civil procedures provide for summary
judgment where there is no genuine issue of any material fact, a case in
which there is no evidence of suicide would never get to trial. Thus,
under the better modern practice the presumption against suicide has no
place at the trial of the factual issues.
Abuse of the application of this presumption conceivably may even
serve to promote self-destruction. A great majority of the courts base the
47
presumption against suicide on a normal person's natural "love of life."
However, do those who are sick, financially oppressed or bereaved from
family tragedies love life to the same degree that a normal individual
loves life? People from all walks of life and from all educational levels
have been known to commit suicide. Modern medicine knows only too
well the extent of mental illness in this country. Who and what is this
"normal person?"
Are not the courts which give effect to the presumption against
suicide based on the natural "love for life" guilty of faulty reasoning? The
court in Grosvenor v. Fidelity 6 Casualty Co. stated:
...When, knowing only that one has died from drinking carbolic
acid, you say you are in doubt as to cause, and then bring into
service the presumption against suicidal intent, you finally conclude
that death was accidental, are you not guilty of that error known
in logic as tetetio principii? . . . Let us suppose experience has
shown that of all the persons who have died from drinking
carbolic acid three out of four were cases of suicide; then, would
it not be possibly absurd to infer in the given case that death
was not intentional? The rule invoked arises when we are ignorant
of the intent and loses its force as a presumption in the presence of
44. It was abolished by statute early in the history of our country, and today all
states have abolished forfeiture to the state for the conviction of any crime.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
46. See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36.
47. See note 38 sup~ra.
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actual facts bearing upon intent. The presumption then comes
in conflict with other presumptions or facts which may overcome
it. There is the almost conclusive presumption that when one
drinks he drinks voluntarily; the presumption that when one drinks
he knows what he is drinking, especially so if he is drinking carbolic
acid; the presumption that when one drinks carbolic acid he knows
the poisonous character of the liquid; and the presumption that
one intends the natural consequences of his own act .... 47a
One writer48 suggests that in each type of death, e.g., poison, carbon
monoxide poisoning in an enclosed garage, etc., that statistics should be
consulted to determine the percentage of deaths which are suicidal before
the court applies the presumption against suicide. Another writer49 states
that there is no longer any basis for a presumption against suicide in
cases where death occurred as a result of hanging because of the lack of
probability. Before applying the presumption against suicide in cases where
death occurred from self-inflicted contact gunshot wounds, the courts should
examine the statistics to determine whether the majority of such deaths
in the past were accidental or suicidal, and the same is true where death
occurred in some other violent manner.
Only where the overwhelming majority of deaths in a particular manner
were not suicidal, should there be a presumption against suicide. Justice
Maxey in Watkins v. PrudentialIns. Co., stated:
When the issue is death by accident against death by suicide,
the data as to the respective total number of deaths from these
two causes is not in the average mind so decisively balanced against
the probability of death by suicide as to 'harden' the inference
against death by suicide into a presumption of law which shifts
the burden of proof to the defendant in a suit on an insurance
policy ....49.
Justice Maxey in the above case referred to the presumption against
suicide as a "phantom of logic, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing
in the sunshine of actual facts." 50
Some courts refer to the presumption as a presumption in favor of
accidental death. 5 Other writers say that the law does not indulge
affirmative presumptions 5 2 and that therefore there is only a presumption
47a. 102 Neb. 629, 631-32, 168 N.W. 596, 597 (1918).
48. See note 43 supra.
49. Report of Accident and Disability Insurance Committee, 17

INS. COUNSEL

J.

317 (1950).
49a. 315 Pa. 497, 507, 173 Atl. 644, 649 (1934).
50. Id. at 512, 173 Atl. at 651.
51. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hatten, 17 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1927); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Little, 146 Ark. 70, 225 S.W. 298 (1920); Berne v. Prudential Ins. Co., 235
Mo. App. 178, 129 S.W.2d 92 (1939); Cutrell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
145 Neb. 550, 17 N.W.2d 465 (1945); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tidwell, 163 Okla.
39, 21 P.2d 28 (1933); Tower v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 125 W. Va. 563,
26 S.E.2d 512 (1943).
52. CORNELIUS, ACCIDENTAL MEANS 74 (2d ed. 1932).
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against suicide or a presumption against death by the fault of another. 63
One case stated that where the evidence was conflicting and the evidence
was more consistent with accidental death than suicide, there is a presumption that death was accidental. 4 In such a case where the issue can be
decided from the weight of the evidence there is no need to lend confusion
by the application of a presumption against suicide.
In the Watkins casc, '

the court stated:

An examination of many cases concerning presumptions, particularly 'presumptions against suicide,' reveals what has been aptly
characterized as a 'welter of loose language and discordant discussion
concerning presumptions.'
This is demonstrated by one case where the court said that the presumption
against suicide was neither a rule of law nor a rule of evidence, but the
court found a way to use it. The Court of Appeals of New York in
Wellisch v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.56 stated that the presumption against suicide,
. . .is not one of those that takes the place of evidence so as
to create a question of fact even when all the real proof is the other
way. . . . Nor is it the sort of 'presumption' that serves only
to shift the burden of proof and disappears from the case as
soon as evidence to the contrary is offered ...It is really a rule
or guide for the jury in coming to a conclusion on the evidence.
Rather than narrow the application of the presumption against suicide,
7
many courts have broadened it.1
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his dissenting opinion in Landress v. Phoenix
Mutual stated that "The attempted distinction between accidental results
and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a
Serbonian Bog."58
The writer submits that the laws with regard to presumption against
suicide are already in that Bog and the only solution is to abandon the
presumption to the Bog. There is no logical basis for the continued
application of this outmoded illusory technique.

53. See collection of cases in Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1950).
54. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Burson, 50 Ga. App. 859, 179 S.E. 390 (1935).
55. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 507, 173 Atl. 644, 649 (1934).

56. 293 N.Y. 178, 184, 56 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1944).

57. "In conclusion, it may be said that what was originally a presumption only
against suicide has now evolved into one against all causes of death other than accident
in cases involving accident insurance contracts and life insurance policies with double
indemnity clauses for accidental death." Friedman, Insurance- The Presumption Against
Suicide, 15 GA. B.J. 349 352 (1953).
58. 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934) (dissenting opinion).
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